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Abstract: 
 
This paper reports from a study exploring the social processes, meanings and 
institutions that frame and produce ‘ethical problems’ and clinical dilemmas for 
practitioners, scientists and others working in the specialty of preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD). A major topic in the data was that, in contrast to IVF, 
the aim of PGD is to transfer to the woman’s womb only those embryos likely 
to be unaffected by serious genetic disorders; that is, to produce ‘healthy 
babies’. Staff described the complex processes through which embryos in 
each treatment cycle must meet a double imperative: they must be judged 
viable by embryologists and ‘unaffected’ by geneticists.  In this paper, we 
focus on some of the ethical, social, and occupational issues for staff ensuing 
from PGD’s double imperative.  (125 words) 
 
Keywords: genetics, PGD, ethics,  embryology 
 
 
Introduction:  
 
This paper reports from a 31 month study that aimed to explore the social 
processes, meanings and institutions that frame and produce ethical issues 
and clinical dilemmas for practitioners, scientists and others working in the 
specialty of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  The aim of this paper is 
to focus on a major topic from our data, the double imperative of PGD, 
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highlighting some of the ethical, social and occupational issues for staff 
ensuing from PGD’s double imperative.   
 
PGD brings together in vitro fertilisation (IVF) technology with clinical 
genetics, necessitating close working relationships between specialist teams 
of embryology and genetics staff. Staff who participated in our study 
described the complex processes through which embryos in each treatment 
cycle must meet a double imperative: they must be judged viable by 
embryologists and ‘unaffected’ by geneticists.  Viewed from this perspective, it 
might appear that we focus here on that interface in a narrowly constituted 
sense and refer only to embryologists and genetics scientists. However, the 
complex mixture of clinical and scientific staff made up from the disciplines of 
nursing, obstetrics and gynaecology, sonography, embryology, molecular and 
cyto-genetics could be characterised differently for other purposes, for 
example clinical and laboratory staff could be seen as two teams or 
collectively as the ‘PGD team’. For this paper, we will refer to embryology and 
genetics ‘teams’ to reflect their broader constitution, but wish to make it clear 
from the outset that although this does reflect the way in which some of the 
staff who participated in our study often represented themselves, it was not 
exclusively so and we have chosen to work with that representation in the 
knowledge that others co-exist. 
 
The treatment goal of practitioners in PGD is to produce a ‘healthy baby’, in 
contrast to IVF, which does not involve selection of embryos on a genetic 
basis.  It is important to stress that although IVF embryos are selected on the 
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basis of their morphology and development in vitro, this is to select the 
embryo most likely to implant and establish a successful pregnancy.  In that 
sense the aim is to select a ‘healthy’ embryo, but embryologists do not claim 
to be selecting embryos that will become ‘healthy’ children and adults. Once a 
pregnancy is established, couples who have used IVF must rely on prenatal 
diagnosis if they wish to establish that their future child is likely to be 
unaffected by a serious genetic condition. It has been argued that one of the 
key advantages of PGD is that it allows women/couples to avoid repeated 
termination of pregnancies following pre-natal diagnosis of genetic disease, 
which may have serious and long-term effects on women/couples (Lavery et 
al, 2002).  PGD offers women/couples who are at risk of having a child with a 
serious genetic condition the option of having their embryos tested before 
implantation and therefore pregnancy, with the aim of avoiding the 
implantation of affected embryos.  This is done so that they can try to avoid 
having a child with a serious disease or disability, thus the term ‘healthy baby’ 
has longer-term significance in PGD. PGD can also help women/couples who 
have experienced repeated miscarriage due to chromosome rearrangements 
such as reciprocal translocation (Braude, Pickering, Flinter & Ogilvie, 2002; 
Soini et al, 2006).  
 
PGD is currently offered in about eight centres in the UK, which must be 
licensed by the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority.  IVF technology 
is used to create embryos in the laboratory, from which one or two cells can 
be tested at three days post fertilisation for specific genetic disorders. The 
embryos are also assessed according to the usual standards for IVF to select 
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those that seem most likely to be viable and to implant successfully in the 
woman’s womb. After genetic testing, unaffected embryos that also meet 
embryological criteria for suitability can then be transferred to the woman, 
where they may successfully implant, or frozen for later use.  Embryos that 
have not been selected for transfer to the woman’s womb for implantation are 
either allowed to perish or donated for research.  The important feature of 
PGD that makes it unique in reproductive technology and that we focus on in 
this paper is that it requires the collaboration of assisted conception teams 
and geneticists, and of course specialised technologies to achieve the double 
imperative of PGD.  
 
Through this and other publications from the study, we contribute to the 
national and international social science and ethics literature on PGD which 
highlights the clinical, ethical and policy dilemmas implicit in this area, from 
the perspective of staff, patients and ‘publics’ (eg Krones & Richter, 2004; 
Roberts & Franklin, 2004; Watt, 2004; Zeiler, 2004; Kalfoglou, Scott and 
Hudson, 2005; Meister, Finck, Stobel-Richter, Schmutzer, and Brahler, 2005; 
Ehrich, Williams, Scott, Sandall and Farsides, 2006; Krones, Schluter, 
Neuwohner, El Ansari, Wissner, and Richter, 2006; Franklin & Roberts, 2006). 
This paper also adds to the growing number of anthropological and 
sociological studies which explore the ways in which clinical/ethical issues are 
discussed and acted upon in clinical settings (Chambliss, 1996; Casper, 1998; 
Williams, Alderson and Farsides, 2002a,b,c; Williams, Sandall, Lewando-
Hundt, Heyman, and Spencer, 2005).  More broadly, this paper contributes to 
the literature on the sociology of biomedical ethics (De Vries & Conrad, 1998; 
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Zussman, 2000; Haimes, 2002).  Rather than presenting ethical reasoning in 
the disembodied ways often characteristic of philosophical bioethics, our 
approach shifts the focus from what should be happening, to what is 
happening (Haimes, 2002; Hedgecoe, 2004; Haimes & Luce, 2006; 
Wainwright, Williams, Michael, Farsides and Cribb, 2006).   
 
Study aim and methods 
 
The aim of the study from which this paper reports was to explore the social 
processes, meanings and institutions that frame and produce ‘ethical 
problems’ and clinical dilemmas for practitioners, scientists and others 
working in the specialty of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  
 
The study, ‘Facilitating Choice, Framing Choice’, used ethnographic methods 
including observation, interviews and ethics discussion groups (EDGs) with 
staff from two Assisted Conception Units (ACU) in the UK offering PGD and 
IVF. (Our research also included  ‘stakeholder’ interviews with representatives 
from religious, activist and patient groups, but these are not reported on here.)  
The study was funded from January 2005 to July 2007.  Our multidisciplinary 
team was comprised of two social scientists, a midwife/social scientist, a 
moral philosopher, an ethical and legal expert, and a clinician.    
 
Following Ethics Committee approval, the study focused on two sites, both 
Assisted Conception Units (ACU) in teaching hospitals in England, which offer 
a mixture of National Health Service (NHS), privately, or ‘self funded’ NHS 
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treatment.  The clinics provide a range of services including IVF to women 
and couples who need fertility treatment, and PGD, which requires many of 
the same procedures and technologies.   
 
Interviews were conducted by the authors (the majority by the main 
researcher, KE). Participants were recruited following explanations of the 
research and informal follow-up approaches from the researchers. 
Interviewees were selected using purposive sampling to include members of 
all the professional disciplines involved in PGD in the settings studied, 
including nursing, obstetrics and gynaecology, sonography, embryology, 
molecular and cyto-genetics, and administration. The interviews were 
conducted as ‘guided conversations’ (Lofland & Lofland, 1984), lasting 
between one and two hours.  Open-ended questions and an informal 
interview schedule were used, with topics such as the status of the embryo; 
staff experiences of working in a multi-disciplinary environment; and the 
opportunities and dilemmas associated with PGD as a new technology. 
 
Observations took place in the clinic (including consultations), laboratories, 
and staff meetings throughout the period of research. Observations in the 
clinic were almost all carried out by the main researcher.  Both authors 
observed in the laboratories, and at staff meetings which occurred at roughly 
six week intervals.   
 
The EDG groups were made up of staff who had been interviewed, as well as 
a small number of staff who were interested in the study but had not been 
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interviewed.  The EDGs were facilitated by a moral philosopher specialising in 
medical ethics  (Alderson, Farsides and Williams, 2002) who was also a 
coapplicant for the study.  To ensure that the EDGs were relevant for staff, the 
topics for each individual EDG were generated from a content analysis of the 
interviews.  EDGs were specifically tailored to those participants taking part by 
addressing the issues and examples they had provided in their earlier 
interviews and their own suggestions for topics that could usefully be 
discussed in the groups (Alderson et al, 2002). The groups lasted two hours 
each, and all of the discussions were tape-recorded and transcribed. 
 
Aim and methods for this paper 
 
The aim of this paper is to focus on a major topic from our data, the double 
imperative of PGD, highlighting some of the ethical, social and occupational 
issues for staff ensuing from PGD’s double imperative.   
 
Transcripts of the interviews and EDGs were analysed using a modified 
version of the framework approach (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). Sections of 
the transcripts relating to topics such as the aims of PGD, choosing embryos 
and inter-disciplinary working were grouped together and analysed for 
content. The topic for this paper was chosen to convey what is most unique 
about PGD and what effects certain features of PGD have on social and 
ethical aspects of the work for staff.  Pertinent sections of the transcripts 
addressing how the embryos are tested, who is responsible for the different 
procedures, and how decisions are made across the two teams, were 
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examined and analysed broadly within a ‘social studies of science’ 
perspective.  
 
Study numbers are used to protect anonymity, and for the same reason 
reference to occupations is in general terms rather than specific job titles, so 
for example the category of ‘counsellor’ could include specialist genetics 
counsellors who provide genetics information or counsellors who work with 
women/couples primarily in relation to emotional issues. We present quotes 
selected from the interviews and the EDGs not to argue for their 
generalisability but to illustrate the views of staff in particular roles.  Although 
there were some differences in the way assisted conception and PGD 
procedures were carried out in the two sites, we have not described these in 
detail as this would compromise the confidentiality we have maintained in 
presenting our findings. 
 
We wish to stress that the views presented here pertain to the medical and 
wider cultural, historical and legal context in which they occurred.  Our 
findings are therefore limited and we do not make claims as to their 
generalisability to other sites within the UK or to settings outside the UK. We 
were also aware of the possible effects that our own role as researchers may 
have had in generating the focus on particular topics such as potential 
conflicts between teams and professions, and in the setting up of the EDGs in 
a particular format, which provided opportunities for staff to explore potentially 
challenging topics.  Brief telephone-based evaluations of the groups, in which 
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each participant commented on the experience, highlighted appreciation of 
the perspicacity and high level of trust generated in the EDGs.   
 
Results 
 
This paper reports on one of the major topics from our study: the double 
imperative of PGD.  We draw here on 41 staff interviews, and seven ethics 
discussion groups from our two study sites, generated between May and 
December 2005, and March and July 2006, and observations throughout the 
period from May 2005 to May 2007.  We present staff views and discussion 
grouped into four themes:  ‘healthy’, not ‘designer’ babies;  bringing together 
two ‘tribes’;  separation and sharing of accountability and control; and choices 
and chances. 
 
‘Healthy’, not ‘designer’ babies 
The first theme addresses contrasts staff made between the purposes of PGD 
and IVF treatment: 
 
Doctor 11:  Couples with certain conditions are given the opportunity 
[through PGD] to have a healthy child. And the majority of those don’t 
know they’ve even got that condition until they’ve had a child.  So I can 
understand they might want to have a healthy child, and they should be 
given that opportunity. IVF is different. It’s not being done for that 
purpose, it’s being done because they can’t have children in the normal 
way. 
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The aim of PGD is not only to ‘produce parents’ (Thomson 2005) since many 
PGD patients have already become parents;  the intention is to produce a 
‘healthy baby’ (and ‘parents of a healthy baby’). The aim of PGD was also 
defined in terms of what it is not: staff in both units criticised the popular press 
and other media portrayals of PGD as giving women/couples a ‘consumerist’ 
opportunity to select embryos for particular features of their future offspring.  
Instead they had a considerable sympathy with women/couples in relation to 
what they saw as the misrepresentation of the goal of PGD:  
 
Genetics scientist 8: It’s not about designer babies, it’s just helping 
people to have normal, healthy children… all they want is a nice 
healthy baby. 
 
This reflects Franklin and Roberts’ (2006) report of the views of women and 
couples who decide to try PGD because they feel it is their only hope of 
having a child unaffected by a serious genetic condition.  They regard 
themselves as being forced to do extraordinary things to achieve what they 
feel is a very ordinary goal in life.  It is interesting that in both of the quotes 
above, normality is referred to, in terms of the ‘normal’ way of having children, 
or ‘normal, healthy children’. The question of what constitutes ‘normality’, 
other than the absence of a serious disease, was discussed in some of the 
EDGs in relation to the criteria for PGD of ‘seriousness’.   Although staff 
recognised that in some instances, for example late onset or low penetrance 
conditions, offering PGD could contribute to changing conceptions of 
normality, staff find it hard to argue against women/couples’ own conclusions 
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about what constitutes seriousness in the context of supporting individual 
autonomy and choice (Williams et al 2007).  This also allowed staff to 
distance themselves to some extent from being implicated for their possible 
contribution to changing concepts of normality that might follow from 
increasing selection and decreasing levels in the criteria for seriousness.  
  
Thompson (2005) argues (drawing on Foucault and Goffman) that the 
variously instrumentalised and embodied procedures used in assisted 
conception clinics are both ‘normalising’ techniques and ‘epistemically 
normative’.  They are normalising, in the sense that they incorporate new 
techniques, knowledge, instruments and patients into existing procedures and 
objects of the clinic (2005:80), and ‘normative’ in the sense that routinised 
skills are often used to separate diagnostically the normal from the abnormal 
(2005:81).  In some ways it could be argued that PGD is only a refinement in 
technological methods that already exist to help women/couples avoid having 
a child with a serious condition, which has already become normalised to a 
large extent through prenatal diagnosis (PND). However the ability to test the 
embryo before implantation has been seen as offering an ethically preferable 
alternative, mainly because it allows women to avoid termination of a 
pregnancy in which the fetus is found to be affected by a serious genetic 
condition. In this respect, the ethical advantage of PGD could be seen as 
giving further impetus to the normalisation of this use of genetic technology.  
This ethical advantage may also contribute to the acceptability of a normative 
delineation between ‘healthy’ and ‘affected’ children as an effect of PGD. 
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Bringing together two ‘tribes’ 
A key feature of PGD is that it demands the coordination and staging of tasks 
from two fields: embryology and genetics. This has significant implications for 
the social and occupational organisation of work in the clinic.  
 
Nurse 1: I think one of the things that really strikes me about working in 
PGD is, obviously the team is made up of people from Genetics and 
people from ACU.  And we have a different way of looking at things.  Of 
course we do.  We come from completely different backgrounds.   
 
Doctor 11:  …there does become a bit of ‘them and us’, isn’t it? The 
nurses say this about the doctors and the doctors say this about the 
embryologists. And I think it’s because we don’t fully understand each 
other’s roles. And it’s interesting, what [another participant] is saying is 
really fascinating, I suddenly thought, ‘You know, you don’t have nearly 
as much personal contact with patients as we do, so you don’t have 
nearly as much feeling about them as we have.’   
 
Like all relationships between ‘tribes’, sometimes the close interdisciplinary 
relationship between the teams that PGD brings together can seem like a kind 
of dance, and sometimes it can include conflict, or the feeling that different 
practices and perspectives mean staff are living in ‘different worlds’. 
 
Genetics scientist 39:  I mean it’s a fight between us and the 
embryologist.  This happens every time, because [her] prime directive 
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is pregnancy, and my prime directive is a normal pregnancy.  These 
people [clients] are not necessarily infertile.   They have waited years 
and years for PGD so that they could try and guarantee a normal child.  
And where [name of embryologist] is coming from is the people that 
[she] generally sees can’t have babies… So it’s two different outlooks. 
 
Genetics scientist 46:  In comparison to ACU staff, we are more 
research scientists… after you’ve done a PhD, you think in a different 
way anyway … in IVF clinic, you just follow protocol.  … not just our 
IVF unit, but any IVF unit.  They’ve got their clinical work, they’ve got to 
do ABC and that’s it, whereas we don’t do it like that, scientists don’t do 
it like that.  So, so it’s, it’s two different worlds.   
 
In another EDG, the participants discussed who makes the decisions about 
which embryos to select for transfer, and the controversial issue of sex 
selection for social reasons (currently illegal in the UK) that can overlap with 
avoiding a sex-linked condition. It became clear that, in contrast to how the 
genetics team view the decision as one which necessarily involves the 
parents, one of the embryologists was accustomed to thinking of the choice 
as a purely clinical one depending only on morphology:  
 
Embryologist 33: Our goal is to get them pregnant regardless of the 
sex, because I mean, even if you go down all the PGD and had a sex 
selection or whatever, ultimately you’re not guaranteed a pregnancy … 
Normal IVF patients go through and they show up at transfer and we 
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say, ‘These two are the best, they’re the ones we’re putting back 
today.’  
 
This range of comments illustrates differences of perspective in terms of 
professional roles, relating to clients, and who should be responsible for 
making decisions about embryo selection.  Looking at it another way, one of 
the clinicians in our study has said that for PGD to be successful an 
embryologist must ‘get into bed’ with a geneticist.  Ideally the design of the 
whole service should reflect the need for close working relationships between 
teams of people, techniques and clinical systems.  However, it cannot be 
taken for granted that they will all share the same worldviews, work goals, or 
working practices. We have addressed this in other papers reporting from this 
study, dealing with ethical issues such as how staff feel about the destruction 
of embryos compared to termination of affected pregnancies (Ehrich et al 
2007a), and to what extent they can support the philosophy of patient choice 
(Ehrich, Williams, Farsides, Sandall and Scott, 2007b).  We have also 
suggested (Ehrich, Williams and Farsides 2008) that sharing overarching 
work goals (e.g. to help women/couples produce a ‘healthy baby’) across the 
teams may help to achieve a workable tension that facilitates cooperative 
relations, even when personal and more micro-level work goals potentially 
produce conflict between actors.  Renegotiation of professional relationships 
in these various ways was a striking feature of the teams we studied seeking 
to achieve the double imperative of PGD.   
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Another concept that is helpful here is one we have used elsewhere (Williams, 
Wainwright, Ehrich and Michael 2008) in relation to embryos moving from the 
social world of PGD to that of embryonic stem cell science.  The notion of 
‘boundary objects’ describes the shared understandings and the collective 
actions which help to manage and unite related but different social worlds.  As 
Star and Griesemer (1989) state, boundary objects can have different 
meanings in different social worlds because they are sufficiently ‘plastic’ and 
can adapt to local needs, yet ‘their structure is common enough to more than 
one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation’ (Star and 
Griesemer 1989, p.393).  Fujimura(1992, p. 173) argues that boundary 
objects emerge through processes of work when elements of the work of 
groups coincide, and Clarke (2005) suggests that the use of this concept can 
allow social scientists to study and analyse the different participants in a 
social world ‘through their distinctive relations with and discourses about the 
specific boundary object in question.’ (Clarke 2005, p.51).  We think this 
concept applies equally well to the translation of embryos from IVF to PGD, 
since in many ways they are produced through processes of work involving 
the two groups of staff and retain important structures in common, yet they 
have different meanings in the two different social worlds.  Therefore embryos 
under conditions of the double imperative act as boundary objects at a point 
of translation, helping to manage and unite the social worlds of IVF and PGD. 
 
Separation and sharing of accountability and control 
The double imperative of PGD has further ethical and social implications for 
professionals involved because of the separation and sharing of technical, 
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clinical and regulatory aspects of accountability and control. One example of 
this is that embryologists remove the cell(s) for testing the embryo and then 
the cells may be prepared for, or transferred directly to, the genetics 
scientists. The biopsy and handover are extremely skilled and critical 
procedures and the teams follow strict protocols to allow each team to have 
control over particular parts of the process.  At the same time, supporting their 
common goal on the overarching level, the teams depend on each other in 
numerous ways, including all aspects of the care and handling, labelling and 
storage of embryos and cells; maintaining the correct air quality and 
temperature of the environment and chemical composition of cell culture 
mediums; and the genetic testing of the biopsied cells.   
 
Efforts were made in both of our study sites to support cooperation between 
teams because of the serious consequences of any technical failures and the 
mutual dependence and accountability of the two teams,. A practical need for 
this arose because at various times the teams at both sites have been located 
in different buildings, at distances requiring over 20 minutes walk or taxi rides, 
and the transport of embryos between them.  The teams at our two sites had 
different histories in this respect:  the teams at one site had moved closer 
together, and the teams at the other site had moved further apart.   Instances 
of cooperation between teams were observed in staff meetings, for example 
in discussions dealing with communication issues (who needs to inform which 
colleagues of which information at what points in time);  the sharing of 
empathy with the clinical and emotional experiences of women/couples;  or 
the arrangement of meetings at times and places that allowed members of the 
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teams to meet together. Discussion of potential or actual conflicts due to the 
more fundamental differences in aims of IVF and PGD were occasionally 
observed in team meetings, and were also addressed in the EDGs. In these 
situations, separation and sharing of aspects of accountability and control 
were a feature of potential conflict, whether on the more pragmatic level or on 
the level of considering ethical dimensions and differences of outlook. 
 
A salient  example concerned the fluctuation in success rates, a common 
situation in all assisted conception units compounded because success rates 
are difficult to quantify, and vary depending on factors including different 
measuring methods used by clinics, the age of the woman and whether the 
embryos used are fresh or frozen (Thompson, 2005).  In the ACUs we 
studied, when the success rates rose, there were celebrations, for example 
sharing cakes and sweets. When there were dips in pregnancy rates, it was 
important for the teams to investigate possible causes, and natural at times to 
seek reasons and place accountability outside their own immediate team. The 
organisations as a whole are affected in various ways by successful 
pregnancy and birth rates and these have important effects on how the teams 
are judged by peers, patients and regulators, which in turn serve  financial 
and institutionally strategic purposes. The double imperative of PGD plays out 
tensions between the scientific and clinical prestige of doing PGD as an 
innovative health technology and the reputation of the clinic for achieving 
successful pregnancies. 
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The constant (re)negotiation of the social order in and between the teams can 
also be seen in group discussions about the ethics of particular cases (what 
stand should we agree on for this case, for what reasons, how does this relate 
to our broader policies), and in forming strategies for how work is presented 
publicly.  All of these instances of fluid movement between separation and 
sharing of accountability for tasks, decisions and public perception can be 
seen as ways in which the ‘technology’ of PGD is performed, interpreted and 
represented.  Different forms of sharing and separation of accountability, 
tensions between micro, team and organisational level goals, and the 
dynamic and emergent representations of PGD can be seen as predictable 
characteristics of a constantly evolving technology (Grint and Woolgar, 1997). 
 
Choices and chances 
Finally, there is the question of how PGD contributes to the range of choices 
available to women/couples with a known genetic condition who want to start 
or increase their family. Prior to PGD, a number of options were available to 
women or couples wishing to avoid having children affected by serious 
genetic conditions, including the use of donor gametes, adoption, or using 
prenatal testing and termination of affected pregnancies. For people who also 
have difficulty conceiving, the IVF part of PGD could be thought of as an 
opportunity for some people to have a greater chance of pregnancy because, 
for one reason, it can produce more embryos than in a natural cycle.   
However, compared to IVF or trying ‘naturally’ and using PND, PGD may 
significantly reduce fertile women’s/couple’s chances of having what is 
sometimes referred to as ‘a take home baby’ (Franklin and Roberts, 2006). 
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This is because the complex coordination of a number of things of different 
kinds together with highly specialised technical, clinical, ethical, legal and 
social processes and bodies of knowledge most often result in no embryos 
meeting PGD’s double imperative.  
 
Nurse 1:  I think that 13/14 [translocation of chromosomes] is quite a 
good example, you know, if a couple has no fertility issues, is able to 
get spontaneously pregnant without too much of a problem,   [… ] then 
I don’t know that we really are doing them favour  by hampering that 
fertility … I don’t think, I think quite often they get in to this system, 
simple thing – you know, maybe they’ve had miscarriages, whatever, 
translocation diagnosed, ‘Oh well they must have PGD’.   Well actually 
that’s not true.  It’s not a ‘must have PGD’ – they have a range of 
options of which PGD is one.  And actually, for the vast majority of 
couples who are fertile in that sort of situation – it works for some of the 
reciprocals as well, PGD is not necessarily going to help them, it’s 
going to hinder them in terms of their chance of getting pregnant.    
 
Thus although PGD offers a further option for some women/couples, at the 
same time it makes the process of decision making between choices more 
complex.  In this sense PGD increases some choices but also reduces certain 
chances. 
 
Staff who participated in our study from different occupational groups and 
from both sites expressed the view that many public and academic opinions of 
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PGD rest on an overestimation of the degree of choice possible between 
embryos in each PGD treatment cycle.  Talk of ‘designer babies’ and 
selecting embryos as if there were a vast pool to choose from caused 
frustration amongst staff.  They often explained that when selecting suitable 
embryos for transfer in PGD, there is a very narrow degree of ‘choice’ 
because there are so few embryos that are assessed as viable 
embryologically and genetically unaffected.   
 
Genetics scientist 39: We are hardly, hardly ever in the position where 
there are two embryos which are genetically normal and 
embryologically good looking…  So I haven’t faced this dilemma yet.  I 
haven’t really had the choice.   
 
Genetics scientist 38:  The whole point is that, and a lot of people don’t 
know this, don’t realise, that… you very rapidly run out of embryos… it 
needs to be said again and again. 
 
From this point of view, both choices and chances are perceived as scarce, 
but we suggest that this may be a taken-for-granted perception of staff who no 
longer see the production of this narrowed down choice as very complex 
because of their everyday embeddedness in the technology of PGD.  
Women/couples who participated in Franklin and Roberts’ ethnography of 
PGD (2006) often expressed their belief that PGD had become the only way 
for them to have a healthy child so their experience was that they had no 
other choice.  Alternative possibilities, such as adoption, or not having 
 23 
children, may not be considered and instead the goal of having a genetically 
related ‘healthy’ child using complex technological intervention comes to be 
perceived as the only ‘choice’. Expression of the feeling that there is not much 
room for choice in both of these senses can be seen as indicators of 
normalisation. We argue that the normalisation of these two versions of 
limited choice is socially significant and part of the gradual, incremental and 
taken-for-granted acceptance of PGD as a new reproductive technology.   
 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper we focus on a major topic from our data, the double imperative of 
PGD, highlighting some of the ethical, social and occupational issues for staff 
that ensue from PGD’s double imperative.  Decisions about the selection of 
embryos to meet the double imperative of PGD take place in ‘a crowded room 
– a room filled with individual assumptions, organizational contexts, and 
social, cultural and political constructs’ (Todd 1989:131). What is more, 
interactions between the people providing and receiving assistance with 
conception and genetic diagnosis are infused with meanings reaching back 
and forth in time.  Focusing on the double imperative of PGD has led us to 
consider specifically how the technologies of IVF and PGD came about, the 
significance of their different origins, and the social organisation of the 
combined technologies brought together to achieve the double imperative of 
PGD.   
 
In PGD, decisions about the future possible existence of each embryo are 
made on the basis of their morphology up to five days post fertilisation, and 
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the testing of one or two cells removed from the embryo at three days.  The 
biopsied cells have no future purpose other than to be tested, yet the fate of 
the embryo from which they were removed will follow on from the testing of 
each cell.  This means that one can consider the biopsied cell as a 
synechdote for an ‘affected’ embryo, and therefore the cutting short of the 
potential for a future person with a serious genetic condition; or alternatively, 
an ‘unaffected’ embryo as the potential for a successful pregnancy, the hope 
for a future ‘healthy child’, the future parenting of this possible child, and the 
existence and life of a new and ‘healthy’ human being. All of these 
possibilities can be seen as being reduced to the embryologist’s assessment 
of the embryos at three to five days, joined by the geneticists’ testing of one or 
two biopsied cells.   
 
PGD entails a workable tension between the various occupational and 
personal work goals of staff (see Ehrich, Williams and Farsides, 2008), and 
competing ideals in treatment (to produce a baby, not to produce particular 
babies). For ACU staff whose primary orientation is to help create life, the 
goal of PGD may be problematic.  For example, embryos that might have 
developed into successful pregnancies are not used for transfer to the woman 
if the genetic diagnosis indicates the child would be at high risk of a serious 
genetic condition, but in some cases this may mean allowing a ‘normal’ 
embryo to perish, such as when selection is only possible through identifying 
the sex of the embryo. This is notwithstanding the situation in which IVF staff 
contribute to the overarching purpose of PGD.  To fulfil the aim of PGD, 
embryology and genetics teams in particular must take account of and 
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engage with technical, scientific and ethical aspects of the other team to 
deliver the treatment, even though these may sometimes conflict with their 
own personal or team work goals (see also Ehrich, Williams and Farsides, 
2008; Ehrich, Farsides, Williams and Scott, 2007a).  An agreement must be 
reached between the two teams on each embryo as to its expected ability to 
lead to a successful pregnancy and develop into a ‘healthy baby’, based on 
their combined expertise and judgement.  PGD therefore departs in important 
ways from IVF and involves the staff in additional personal, occupational, 
political and ethical considerations about the nature of their work. 
 
The coming together of IVF and genetics technologies, expertise, staff, and 
various human substances, and the culmination of processes that lead to 
deciding which embryos to transfer to the woman’s body also stands for 
another much larger set of ‘things’:  PGD entails the coordination of medical 
and scientific knowledge, skill, decision-making, regulation and so on, all of 
which are infused with ethical, cultural and social values, practices, 
knowledge, beliefs, and aims.  In a broad sense, the emphasis on the 
morphology of the embryo stands for the aims of embryologists (and assisted 
conception generally) to help create life, whereas the additional emphasis in 
PGD on the results of genetic tests stands for the prevention of certain forms 
of life (see Franklin and Roberts, 2006, on the ‘born and made’ distinction) 
and both positions are supported by their own social and ethical arguments. 
The embryo selected for transfer after PGD could stand for the achievement 
of these two simultaneous goals (which for some people are contradictory).  
Building on our previous work on the two social worlds of PGD and embryonic 
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stem cell science (Williams et al 2008), and following Fujimura’s point that 
boundary objects can both enable and disable particular social actions 
(Fujimura 1992, p 204), we argue that embryos as boundary objects enable 
some futures in IVF and disable certain futures in PGD, as well as articulating 
common and different processes in the two social worlds. 
 
These findings resonate with Casper’s (1998) work on fetal surgery, in which 
she argues that the interests of the fetus and the mother are reflected in the 
joint work of different medical and scientific specialties, and constructions of 
the fetus as work object vary depending on their different work goals.  Further, 
in a similar way to Casper’s argument that fetal surgery creates a new 
subject, the ‘fetal patient’, we suggest that the coming together of medical and 
scientific specialties in PGD could also be considered as creating both a new 
hybrid field, and a new hybrid subject, the PGD embryo standing for a future 
‘healthy baby’.   
  
In support of Thompson’s (2005) argument that the variously instrumentalised 
and embodied procedures used in assisted reproduction are both 
‘normalising’ techniques and ‘epistemically normative’, we suggest that PGD 
as a technology for producing ‘healthy’ babies helps to normalise the desire of 
parents to avoid having a child with serious genetic disease, and may 
contribute to a changing normative delineation between ‘healthy’ and 
‘affected’ children.  The procedures, professional knowledge and techniques 
of PGD can also be seen as constituting a further gradual, incremental (but 
perhaps not yet publicly taken for granted) normative effect in this sense. 
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However, rather than seeing this as an effect of ‘technology’ on ‘society’, we 
are interested in how professionals position PGD socially and ethically as 
indications of its broader interpretation and representation, lending authority to 
certain ways of seeing things, people, and relationships according to 
particular, but changing, views of normality.  It could be claimed that PGD 
translates the purpose of IVF (for some clients and professionals), because 
the aim of PGD is to prevent the birth of children with serious genetic 
conditions, whereas in IVF the aim is to achieve a successful pregnancy and 
any attempt to ensure the baby is ‘healthy’ in terms of serious conditions must 
rely on prenatal testing.  However in both IVF and PGD, staff share a similar 
view of embryos in terms of the scarcity value of embryos that develop into 
successful pregnancies and ‘healthy babies’.  Staff in our study placed an 
emphasis on the fact that most embryos do not develop into successful 
pregnancies, and therefore the idea that people could select between a range 
of embryos, in the way that those who compare PGD to eugenic practices 
envisage, does not match their experience.   
 
One could argue that a technology’s capacity and capability always rely on its 
interpretation, and the point is to analyse how persuasive certain accounts 
may be (Foucault 1980, Grint and Woolgar 1997). Taking this stance one 
might claim that our knowledge of a technology such as PGD is constructed 
by the more powerful and collective elements of our society that represent 
PGD as a technology that prevents suffering, distress, illness and disability, 
and that this has won out over efforts to construct it differently, for example as 
a ‘weapon of destruction’ (Quintavalle, 2006). Grint and Woolgar (1997) argue 
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that the nature and characteristics of a technology and its capacities are 
crucial matters to investigate because they are representations of our social 
capacities and capabilities. In contrast to debates polarising ‘technology’ and 
‘the social’, they argue that the two tendencies (technology and the social) are 
both aspects of a negotiated order, so that technologies are continually 
(re)interpreted and (re)constituted. Thus people, various systems, forms of 
training, configurations of the ‘users’ (clients are constituted as ‘appropriate’ 
users of PGD and ‘educated’ as part of that process), the division of 
occupational roles and other social arrangements and relations are all part of 
this emergent ’technology’.  
 
PGD, like IVF, can be seen as a performed community of social relations that 
continually adapts to new technological and social developments.  However, 
like other biotechnologies, PGD and IVF are comprised not only of Petri 
dishes, microscopes and so on, but also of people, practices, and social 
relations, and these are not so reliably translated or reversed.  In contrast to a 
view that once a technology has been designed it carries political and 
historical features that lock in aspects of those social arrangements, we agree 
with Grint and Woolgar (1997) that this underestimates the significance of 
actors’ continuing interpretations and uses of the technology. Because the 
techniques of IVF and genetic diagnosis were originally created for quite 
different purposes than that to which their combination is employed in PGD, it 
should not be surprising that the social significance originally adhering to them 
as separate technologies (in the broader sense) persists and therefore we 
could conceptualise the performance in which the teams and possibly its 
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‘users’ act in terms of emergent, contingent and therefore unstable relations 
as a predictable effect of an emergent technology.   
 
In conclusion, we have explored in this paper a major topic in our study of 
PGD – the double imperative it imposes on embryos before implantation – 
and some of the ethical, social and occupational issues that ensue from this 
double imperative for staff working in this field.  We consider that thinking of 
the embryo as a boundary object in IVF and PGD, or thinking of the PGD 
embryo as a new hybrid subject, and subject to predictable forms of social 
relations characteristic of emergent technologies, are useful tools with which 
to analyse the social and ethical dilemmas and conflicts that arise in PGD but 
have also been the subject of our programme of study of developments in 
reproductive technology including the status of the fetus, fetal surgery, 
prenatal diagnosis and PGD (Williams 2005; Williams 2006; Williams, 
Alderson & Farsides 2002a,b,c; Williams,Sandall, Lewando-Hundt, Heyman & 
Spencer 2005, Ehrich, Williams & Farsides 2008, Ehrich, Farsides,Williams & 
Scott 2007) and stem cell science (Wainwright et al 2006, Williams et al 
2008).  As a hybrid, emergent technology, PGD enables some futures but 
also disables certain futures. It provides, for some women/couples as well as 
staff, an ethically preferable alternative to previous means of trying to ensure 
the long-term health of a baby in families who are at high risk of having a baby 
with a serious genetic condition, and therefore may contribute to normalisation 
of the desire to prevent the birth of such children.  The emphasis of both 
teams on the scarcity of embryos that will develop into a successful 
pregnancy and a ‘healthy baby’ stand in contrast to the idea of eugenic 
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selection from an abundance of embryos.  Despite some differences between 
the two teams in terms of work goals and important practical issues, the 
double imperative of PGD serves to unite them in emphasising the scarcity 
value of embryos that are likely to produce a ‘healthy baby’. 
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